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The Yugoslav Crisis and the National Question
Summary: Yugoslavia's economic and political
situation continues to
deteriorate, and the
repercussions have had a serious effect on
relations
between
ethnic
groups.
The
forthcoming plenum of the Central Committee of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia will
discuss the escalation of ethnic tension, which
has caused deep divisions in Yugoslavia's ruling
party.

* * *
In two separate statements issued on July 26, Yugoslavia's
highest political and state bodies called for an end to
nationalist disputes.
An open appeal by the eight-member
collective State Presidency said that ethnic conflicts had
jeopardized the unity of multinational Yugoslavia and called for
the "strict application of the law" in dealing with people who
incited hatred of other ethnic groups. The Presidium of the
Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
(LCY) called on all party leaders to direct their energies to
economic and social reform "instead of engaging in unproductive
and unprincipled coalitions." 1
Much of this has been heard in the past, but the importance
of the two statements lies in the.ir timing. On July 30 and 31
the Central Committee of the LCY will meet at its 25th plenum to
discuss how to deal with
the
country's
escalating
ethnic
problems.
Almost three months ago there were indications that
such a meeting would be held in late June or early July. The
complexity of the issue and the fact that the LCY leadership is
deeply divided over economic and political issues may help to
explain why the long-awaited meeting was put off until now.
Hard-Line Serbia, Liberal Slovenia. On the eve of the
plenum, the party has revealed how fundamentally divided it is
over ethnic relations.
On July 27 the Central Committee's
commission on intranational relations called on the party to
oppose all forms of nationalism including what it described as
increasing demands for the privileged treatment of Yugoslavia's
larger nationality groups at the expense of the smaller ones.
The commission, which is headed by Dusan Dragosavac, a Serb from
Croatia, received full support from the Slovenian and Croatian
republican leaderships, who praised the proposal; but Serbia
rejected it as "unacceptable" and implied that the Serbs were
seeking special privileges because they represented the largest
ethnic group in Yugoslavia (about 40% of Yugoslavia's 23,500,000
citizens are Serbs). 2
Confrontation between the
leaders
of
Serbia and of
Slovenia,
the country's most economically
developed
and
politically liberal republic, has shown no signs of abating. On
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July 27 Slovenia's National Assembly adopted draft amendments to
the republic's constitution that are expected to be promulgated
by the end of Septernber. 3 The most controversial amendment
clearly defines Slovenia's right to secession and states that
the right to self-determination can be decided through a public
referendum; although the federal constitution states the right
to secession, there is disagreement over wheth~r this right is
implicit or explicit.
Nonetheless, Serbia has alluded to
Slovenian threats to secede under certain circumstances by
criticizing the
CC
commission's
document
for obscuring
"separatist and confederalist tendencies . . . . "
In any event, it is highly unlikely that Sloven1a will
secede from Yugoslavia, given its important and influential role
in the country•s economy and politics and its dependence on
natural
resources
in
Serbia,
Macedonia,
Kosovo,
and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In an interview with Radio F·ree Europe,
Dimitri Rupel, Editor in Chief of Demokratija, Yugoslavia•s
first opposition political biweekly, said that "the amendment on
self-determination
is
merely
a
threat
and part of the
psychological war Slovenia is waging against conservatives in
Belgrade." He added that
"the
risks,
such as military
intervention, far outweigh the potential benefits." 4
Enter the Croats. Recent developments in the republic of
Croatia clearly indicate a worsening of relations between
Croatia
and
Serbia
as
well.
The
increase
in
nationalist-inspired activities
by Croatia's Serbian minority
and the reaction from Croatia's leaders prompted statements on
the immediate need to
end
inter-ethnic
conf li.cts
and
condemnations of all expressions of militant nationalism from
the LCY CC Presidium on July 18 and 26, the Army CC Presidium on
July 12, and by many regional and local political organizations.
Such feelings have been building up over the past year.
What sparked
these
particular
remarks,
however, was a
provocative Serbian nationalist demonstration on July 9 in the
Croatian town of Knin, which is heavily populated by Serbs.
According to some reports, up to 50,000 Serbs, many from other
parts of the republic and from Serbia and the autonomous
provinces
of Kosovo and Vojvodina, protested against the
cultural and social policies of the · Croatian leadership, which
they and other Serbs regard as discrirninatory. 5
(In late
February there was a similar rally in the Knin region, with the
participation of some 10,000 Serbs.)
The protest in Knin came at the end of the officially
sanctioned 2-day celebration of the 600th anniversary of the
defeat of the Serbian Army by the Ottoman Turks at the Battle of
Kosovo Polje. Over the last year large numbers of Serbs have
participated in numerous rallies in Serbia, Vojvodina, and
Kosovo; they may have used the Knin demonstration as an
opportunity to mark the first anniversary of the small but
well-organized protest in the Vojvodina capital of Novi Sad ;
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which many Yugoslavs believe was organized by Serbs loyal to
Slobodan Milosevic, who is currently Serbia's State President.
The demonstration in Knin came about three weeks after the
Croatian National Assembly had voted to retain the republic's
1974 constitutional amendment, which states that "the Croatian
literary language is the standardized form of the popular
language of Croats and Serbs in Croatia." 6
In 1987 Croatia's
party Presidium proposed changing the regulation so that the
official language would be either Croatian or Serbian; this was
a compromise prompted by demands from Croatia's Serbs, who
comprise more than 10% of the republic's 4,600,000 inhabitants5
Over the past year the Croatian authorities has feared that
Serhian dissatisfaction might lead to an outbreak of ethnic
violence and demands for special rights for the Serbs, such as
had occurred in Kosovo .
. The Knin demonstration sent a clear message to
the
country's leaders, much as the bloody protests in Kosovo of late
March 1989 did. Both events must have shaken the leadership;
and they have certainly caused speculation about the future
political role of the Yugoslav Peoples' Army, which has a
reputation as the only
federal institution unaffected by
political and economic decentralization and regional squabbles
within its own ranks.
Some Deeply-rooted Problems. The CC plenum this weekend
comes at a time when an explosive situation has been fueled by a
continuing fall in living standards and by the exacerbation of
the nationality problem by
poverty
and regional economic
dislocation.
In recent years there has been a general feeling
of uncertainty over the future of this multinational country;
that might help explain the impatience found at every level of
society.
Since July 1988 an estimated 6,000,000 people have taken
part .in ethnic-related protest rallies, most of which were
organized by regional party leaders; several protests succeeded
in toppling senior regional and local leaders. In 1988 there
were 1,720 strikes involving some 400,000 workers; most of those
strikes were protesting wage freezes imposed by the federal
government.
Figures for the first five months of 1989 show an
increase in the number of strikes compared with the same period
last
year 1
Al though the current government under
Ante
Markovic, a Croat, has expressed no desire to implement an
anti-inflationary
policy, this possibility should not
be
excludedo Imposing a wage freeze. now would certainly increase
labor unrest.
o

The reasons for Yugoslavia's economic and political debacle
are extremely complex and are rooted in the country's political
systerno Since the war there have been various periods of reform
followed by periods of opposition to reform. The current trend
points to economic reform, but the escalation of various kinds
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of regional particularism and nationalism is likely to result in
political compromises that would produce half-measures and
little improvement.
Moreover, the Serbian leadership, while
formally claiming that it favors reform, actually follows
policies that seem to favor
state capitalism rather than
decentralization and a market economy.
Over the past five years, party leaders and scores of
intellectuals have said that Yugoslavia's political paralysis is
the principal obstacle to the much needed economic and political
changes. This paralysis has largely been brought about by a
decentralized political structure whereby the party in each of
the six republics and two autonomous provinces defends its
interests at the expense of the country as a whole. The current
battle over the future of Yugoslavia involves those leaders who
are seeking to recentralize and strengthen federal control over
the economy and government and those who wish to continue with a
decentralized system of government and social self-management.
This dispute has been aggravated by Serbia's state leader
Slobodan Milosevic, who has exploited Serbian grievances for his
own political ends. Many Yugoslavs suspect that his proposals
for greater centralization are nothing but a veiled attempt to
increase Serbia's and, above all, his own power.
There
is at least formal agreement,
however,
that
Yugoslavia will have no chance of surviving unless it creates a
unified and integrated market economy. No clear answers have
been given, however, to the question of what kind of unified
market would be created. Many Slovenes and Croats fear that such
a system would be dominated by Serbia, as was the case in prewar
Yugoslavia (Tito's federal system was set up precisely to avoid
a repetition of such an arrangement, under which the other
peoples felt oppressed). Many Yugoslavs in the poorer southern
regions, including Serbia, believe that Slovenia and Croatia
would be the benefactors at the expense of the south.
Serbia's Latest Initiative.
On July 13 Serbia's party
Presidium issued a statement calling for the reform of the
economic and political system. On July 21 Serbia's CC approved
the proposals and the Serbian State Presidency's Commission for
Political Reform, headed by- Slobodan Vucetic, a member of
Serbia's Socialist Alliance Presidium, announced proposals for
far-reaching political
changes.
On July 25 Serbia's State
Presidency,
headed by Milosevic, issued the
Commission's
document, which calls for sweeping changes in the federal
constitution that allegedly seek to refotrn the economic and
political system. 8

Serbia's

plans

for

reform are designed to

increase

the
federal governmentvs powers.
The proposals also call for a
national scientific research program; a system of environmental
protection; the establishment of an independent judiciary; and
the guarantee of freedom of thought, expression, and of the
press. On political pluralism they do not go as far as many
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would like.
'rhey urge the development "of the right of all
citizens to join associations and societies freely" and that the
"possibility
of
other
forms
of
pluralistic
political
organizations . . . should
not
be excluded." They go on to
advocate free and direct elections, in which candidates could be
proposed by independent citizens' associations.
(Slovenia~s
proposed constitutional amendments envisage permitting citizens
to form independent associ.ations and trade unicns.) The creation
of a parliamentary chamber that would have broader powers than
the federation's
current
National
Assembly is proposed;
delegates would be elected by universal suffrage and the number
of deputies would be related to the size of the populations in
the respective republicso (Slovenes and Croats see this as an
unfair advantage and claim that it goes against the Titoist
principle of full equality and equal representation.)
Although Serbia's leadership has made similar proposals in
the past, this is the
first
time that they have been
incorporated into a single document. It is also the first time
that a senior state body in
Yugoslavia
has proposed such
sweeping reforms.
The statement did, however, stop short of
calling for a multiparty system, which has been demanded by the
Serbian
Writers' Association and individual
nonconformist
intellectuals. Nonetheless, the Serbian leadership's proposals
have much in common with those of Serbia's writers
and
intellectuals and also much of what is being demanded in
Slovenia. Milosevic's actual commitment to pluralism and human
rights is more than open to question, however, given the tough
methods he has used in consolidating and expanding his power and
his ruthless suppression of the Kosovo Albanians. The Serbian
initiative came less than two weeks after high-level talks
between Milosevic and the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Macedonia; Bosnian and Macedonian officials also met with their
Croatian and Slovenian counterparts
two weeks before the
proposals for reformo
Conclusion.
The forthcoming plenum on ethnic relations
will no doubt reiterate the strong words of previous sessions
and those expressed at republican-level CC sessions over the
past two months. So far, however, the party has simply been
meandering from one event to another and from one party meeting
to another, responding only to the current wishes of regional
leaders and events without much, if any, agreement on a future
program for the country.
Milan Andrejevich
1

Borba (Belgrade), 27 July 1989. Andjelko Runjic, President of Croatiavs
National Assembly, remarked on July 27: "Instead of trying to solve social
and economic problems, too much energy is being wasted in Yugoslavia on
absurd nationalistic vying to outwit one another while exposing the federal
community to threatening ordeals" (Vjesnik [Zagreb], 28 July 1989).
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Politika {Belgrade), 28 July 1989. The party Presidiums of Montenegro,
Vojvodina, and Kosovo
strongly
disagreed
with
the proposal; and
reservations were expressed by the party Presidium of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
It is not known how Macedonia's republican party leadership reacted to the
LCY cc Presidium's proposal.

3

Delo tLjubljana), 28 July 1989.

4

22 June 1989.

5

Vjesnik, 10, 11, and 12 July 1989.

6

Ibid., 22 June and 1 July 1989.

7

Tanjug, 9 July 1989.
The news agency said that 708 strikes involving
157,191 workers had taken ·place during the first 5 months of 1989. This was
not including the 230 strikes involving 51,000 workers that had taken place
in Kosovo during the same period, which officials of the Yugoslav Trade
Union Confederation said had been motivated by issues that were not
economic.

8

Politika, 14, 21, 22 and 26 July 1989.

1

The cover of Mladina, the weekly of
the
Slovenian
Socialist
Youth
Alliance
(7 July 1989,
no. 25),
takes a
view
of
the
June 28
celebration commemorating the 600th
anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo
Polje.
The
cover,
by
Josip
Visarjonovic, depicts Milosevic as
Serbia's Prince Lazar leading the
barbaric-looking Serbs against the
advocates of modern democracy and
technology. The man in green is a
Slovene, the man in white is an
ethnic Albanian.
Milosevic is also
supported by the army; the tank's
insignias bear the red star and the
four Ss, which is an abbreviation of
the famous
Serbian
rallying-cry
"Samo Slogan Srbina Spasava" ( which
is taken to mean "Only Unity can
Save the Serbs"; literally it means
is
Serbia's
Only
"Harmony
Salvation").
For added effect, the
cover is
in
cyrillic.
On the
right-hand corner under the Hladina
heading is the price of the weekly
in
dinars
and lipe;
lipe
is
Mladina's concoction for Slovenia's
own national currency.
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Bickering Within the LCY Central Committee Continues
With no Solutions in Sight
Summary: The latest
plenum of the Central
Committee
of the League of Communists
of
Yugoslavia was intended to discuss solutions to
the persistent problem of interethnic conflicts
in multinational Yugoslavia but seems to have
only left matters worse off.

* * *
The 25th plenum of the Central Committee of the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), which was held on July 30 and
31, produced nothing but a stream of accusations and complaints
that once again revealed how the old differences within the
party persist. The Central Committee had been called on to find
a solution to Yugoslavia's escalating ethnic tension, or at
least to discuss how it might be tackled; once again, however,
the party was unable to agree on its approach. The Sarajevo
daily
Oslobodjenje wrote of the plenum that the Central
Committee had "not only failed to re-establish its reputation
but [had] even taken a step backwa!:'d" 1
;
and the Belgrade
tabloid Vecernje N9vosti headlined its coverage of the plenum
"Quarrels of the Powerless." 2
Forty-four speeches were delivered at the plenum and there
were almost sixty interjections and responses, many of which
demonstrated the strong differences of opinion between the
participants.
As expected, there was confrontation between
delegates from Serbia and those from Slovenia and Croatia. The
representatives from
Bosnia-Herzegovina
also attacked the
Serbian leadership.
The Ljubljana daily Delo reported that criticism at the
plenum had largely been aimed at Serbian nationalism, which "had
been permitted to pass until now by many [of the country's
leaders] and which has lately provoked much political turmoil in
the country." 3
There was also considerable criticism
of
Serbia's political leadership; names were not mentioned, but the
remarks were cl.early directed at Serbia's State President
Slobodan Milosevic. An organization of World War Two veterans
in
Belgrade
commented that the plenum had created
"an
4
unprincipled anti-Serbian coalition."
Many of Yugoslavia's
dailies wrote about the plenum the day after it had ended, but
Politika, which supports Milosevic, refrained from comment. In
short, Milosevic and his followers came under sharp attack but
were unable to respond to clearfy formulated arguments with
convincing responses, often finding themselves trying to deny
the obvious.
Serbia on the Defensive. In the keynote speech by Ivica
Racan, one of Croatia's representatives on the 23-member CC
Presidium, he made it clear that increasing ethnic conflicts had
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"penetrated the party and affected its leaders."
Without
mentioning names, he said that ethnic strife was being misused
by "national leaders . . . . [in order] to create new monopolies
on power." He added that "separatism and centralism are two
opposing poles of bureaucratic nationalism." 5
(Serbia has
accused Slovenia of separatism, and the Serbs in general and
Milosevic in particular are accused of excesses against the
Kosovo Albanians and of trying to achieve domination of the
federation as a whole through recentralization.)
The thrust of his speech was, however, clearly directed
against Milosevic and his Serbian leadership. Racan referred to
and refuted a number of slogans and arguments advanced by the
Serbian
nationalists,
stressing
that such
people
were
jeopardizing the
stability
of
Yugoslavia.
For example,
apparently referring to the slogan "a strong Serbia means a
strong Yugoslavia," he retorted that federal Yugoslavia could
not be strong if one republic in particular were; elsewhere he
noted that numbers and size did not entitle any group to special
privileges in interethnic relations, thus countering another
Serbian claim.
Futhermore,
he
pointed
out
the logical
contradiction in Milosevic's description of his own supporters'
taking politics into the streets as "street democracy," while
describing the Albanians' public protests as "nationalistic" and
"counterrevolutionary."
Finally,
Racan warned against the
demagogic claim of Serbian nationalists to special treatment on
the grounds that Serbia had "done the most" for Yugoslavia; he
described this as pure nationalism.
Some Moslem speakers from Bosnia-Herzegovina made similar
criticism, referring to the recent Serbian commemoration of the
600th anniversary
of
the
Battle
of
Kosovo
Polje as
"nationalistic insanity." They made clear that they were aware
of and resented activities in Serbia aimed at "exporting
revolution" and stirring up Serbian minorities elsewhere in
Yugoslavia, including Bosnia; and they singled out in particular
the aggressive attitudes of the nationalistic Sava Society in
Novi. Pazar.
The party veteran Dusan Dragosavac, a Serb from Croatia who
was President of the Presidium of the LCY CC from 1981 to 1982,
similarly warned against Serbian nationalism.He stressed that it
could easily press a Croatian backlash and compared the current
pitch of Serbian nationalist feeling to that of Croatian
nationalism in 1971, when Tito had to intervene and purge the
Zagreb leadership&
Dragosavac also came up with some proposals for dealing
with interethnic disputes. He recommended that the Presidium be
charged with three tasks9 First, with "disassociating its
leadership from those who are tearing Yugoslavia apart"; he
added that the quarrels between regional party leaderships
should be settled by the Presidium "rather than through quarrels
conducted via journalists."' Secondly, he recommended that the
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party's Presidium examine carefully (he did not go so far as to
say that they should act on) the current dispute between Serbia
and Croatia. (The dispute arose partly over a recent aggressive
Serbian demonstration in Knin of the kind referred to by one
Bosnian speaker.) He warned that if this were not done, "the
problem may get worse." Finally, Dragosavac proposed that the
Presidium publicly reveal who in the CC constituted the much
talked about anti-Serbian, anti-Croatian, and anti-Slovenian
coalitions. 6

The Serbian speakers mostly appeared to have been put on
the
defensive.
They denied that their
leadership
was
nationalistic, separatist, or seeking power~ In reply to thinly
veiled criticism of Milosevic himself, one of them said: "leave
him alone."
Army
Representative
Speaks
out.
The Serbs, Croats,
Bosnians and Slovenes generally occupied center stage, but the
other republics and the military were not totally silent~
Yugoslavia's
Assistant Defense Min.ister, Lisutenant-Colonel
General Simeon Buncic, told the CC in a lengthy speech that it
had to "show more courage" in tackling the countryts problems
and that the cc "should let people know the truth about the
nature of the current conflicts and seething contradictions in
societyD" He said that "there must be unanimity in assessing the
danger of growing nationalism and the anticommunist ideology and
practice stermning from it." Some of the causes of the current
conflicts, he said, could be found in the political and economic
system; but the main one was the split in the country's
leadership over the "methods and means of overcoming the
crisis . . . and over Yugoslavia's prospects." 7 He added that
people's
minds are burdened by propaganda about the
negative aspects of life • • • to such an extent that it is
a miracle that the incidence of fascist-inspired behavior
by various militant nationalist groups at public gatherings
has not been even greater.

Buncic did say, however, that he was encouraged by the
positions on interethnic relations adopted by the republican,
provincial, and Yugoslav Peoples' Army party leaderships prior
to the plenum.
He described them as · having "established a
principle and postulate about
how to develop interethnic
relations."
Prime Minister Defends Economic Policies.
A dramatic
aspect of the plenum, however, hag more to do with the federal
government's economic reform program than with ethnic conflicts
(although the deterioration
in
the
economy has clearly
exacerbated the nationality problem).
Prime Minister Ante
Markovic, a Croat, defended the reform program adopted in May
1988 at the LCY's First Conference and ratified by the Federal
Assembly through amendments to the federal constitution in
November 1988.

Yugoslav SR/10

12

17 August 1989

Markovic said that ''a scenario is being prepared to topple
those who are blamed for everything that is wrong in society." 8
He added that after having toured all the republics and
provinces over the past month, his impression was that the local
politicians were still controlling economic policy and "trying
to impose technological and developmental solutions,lt
the
implication
being
that
they
were
working
against the
government's reform program.
Most of the criticism of the economic reforms has come from
Serbia; there have also, however, been complaints from Macedonia
and Montenegro. It is argued that the Markovic government's
policies would strengthen the economies of the more advanced
republics--Slovenia and Croatia--at the expense of the poorer
southern republics--Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
and Serbia, including Kosovo. It should be noted, however, that
most of these reforms, including the laws passed before Markovic
became Prime Minister in March 1989, were formally agreed upon
by all Yugoslavia's six republics and two autonomous provinces.
Milosevic's real motives in attacking the Prime Minister remain
open to question.
Conclusion.
In short, the divided party still seems
incapable of solving the basic questions facing Yugoslavia, and
tendencies in Serbia continue to alarm many. The population at
large, however, may not be patient for much longer.
A
mass
protest rally of farmers from most parts of the country is
scheduled to take place in front of the Federal Assembly
building in Belgrade on August 28 to coincide with the next CC
plenum and a week prior to the opening of the four-day session
of the ninth summit of nonaligned nations in the capital on
September 4 • s
There is impatience, frustration, skepticism, and distrust
of the country's leadership at every level of society. A letter
from a retired pharmacist and a former partisan that was
recently published in De1o10
suggested that the Extraordinary
14th Congress of the LCY scheduled for December should be held
on the Adriatic island of Goli, the site of the once notorious
political prison sometimes referred to as "Tito's Gulag . " The
crumbling prison complex and walls still stand. The writer of
the letter said:
As a Yugoslav, I am unnerved by the interrepublican
quarrels and accusations. That is why I recommend that the
Congress of the LCY be held on the island of Goli. When the
delegates arrive, each should be given two blankets, half a
kilogram of bread, and a liter of water and they should be
informed that they can be released to go to home only after
they have reconciled all their misunderstandings. It is

not necessary that they carry rocks for 12 hours a day; 6
hours is sufficient. After such a day at work, let them
settle all the
problems
[facing
Yugoslavia].
I am

17 August 1989
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convinced that under such conditions the delegates
very quickly resolve all wmecessary disagreements.

would

Milan Andrejevich with Patrick Moore
1 Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), 1 August 1989.
2

Vecernje Hovosti {Belgrade),

3

Delo (Llubljana), 1 August 1989.

4

Politika (Belgrade), 1 August 1989.

5

Borba (Belgrade), 31 July 1989.

6

Ibid., 1 August 1989.

7

Ibid., 31 July 1989.

8

Ibid.

9

Politika Ekspres (Be~grade), 30 July 1989;

10

~

August 1989.

Borba, 31 July 1989.

The letter was from Mrs Zdenka Bacic of Ljubljana. The prison was closed
in the early spring of 1988. The island is currently open to tourists and
there are plans to designate several beaches for nudistso
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"Spreading Nationalism," by Toso Borkovic in Vecernje
Novosti (Belgrade) 2 August 1989.
Borkovic's politician in
white--implying it is Milosevic, who is known for his preference
for light-colored suits--is being beaten by primitives. The
term "primitivism" is commonly used by politicians to describe
"primitive nationalism" in Yugoslavia.
Most major Yugoslav
dailies commented that Serbia and Milosevic had taken a verbal
"beating" at the 25th CC plenum.
The politicians in black are
handing out balloons of speech that resemble stone-age clubs.
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Inflation and Decentralization
Summary: Ethnic strife and decentraliza.t ion have
prevented
the
Yugoslav
authorities
from
overcoming rising inflation.
The example of
Yugoslavia as a model for economic reform is an
instructive
and
worrisome
one
for other
countries in Eastern Europe,.

* * *
At a tlme when the government and other politicians in the
Soviet Union are speaking with trepidation about the prospect of
an explosion in prices and when in Poland, where food prices
have recently tripled, this fear has become a reality, Yugoslav
inflation continues to soar. The latest official figure puts it
at almost 790%. 1 Even this figure, however, does not convey the
full reality: it has been reported, 2
for example,
that
Yugoslavs are now bundling up dinar notes and trading their
volume for hard currency. Despite repeated assertions by various
Yugoslav public officials over the past few months that they
were on the verge of halting inflation, neither the previous
government of Branko Mikulic nor the current one under Ante
Markovic has shown any ability to do so. The reasons for this
failure say much about Yugoslavia's diffi.culties in instituting
market reforms and present a grim picture for the Poles and
Soviets to contemplateo
Yugoslavia, like Poland, is
suffering from the heavy
borrowing of the 1960s and 1970s. Its current external debt,
though it has decreased somewhat, still exceeds $19 billion. A
rapidly declining standard of living has accompanied
the
country's attempts to service this debt. Political pressure on
the government to do something about the situation has forced it
to accept the demands of the World Bank and the International
Monetary
Fund
that
the Yugoslav
economy
become
more
market-oriented.
As a result, for quite some time Yugoslav politicians have
almost all at least paid lip·-service to the principle of
economic reform.
No matter what part of the country they
represent or their ideological affiliation, these politicians
all maintain that the economy must be freed from bureaucratic
and party interference. There have consequently been a number of
moves to increase private initiative, including the setting up
of more joint ventures; the elimination of many restrictions on
foreign-owned businesses; and slightly greater flexibility in
dealing with the work force.
Nevertheless, these and other
reforms, together with concurrent attempts to rein in. state
spending, have so far done little to bring down inflation.
The cause of
this
ineffectiveness,
besides
residual
bureaucratic and ideological inertia, lies principally with the
decentralized system created by Josip · Broz Tito, a system that
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in essence established a series of ethnically-based separate
republics within a formal Yugoslav federation.
By placing
political and economic power in the hands of the governments of
the various republics,
control
was
shifted but did not
disappear; it was merely transferred to the regional level.
Therefore -, instead of
one
centralized
party
and state
bureaucracy directing and deadening the economy, Yugoslavia has
multiple smaller bureaucracies competing against one another for
slices of the federal pie. It is in the interests of the
officials of these republican agencies to get as much money as
possible from the f~deral treasury, because their dispersal of
these funds is the sourc~ of their power and position.
Decentralization has thus had two main effects: it has
increased the sense of ethnic identification of the people in
the republics and provinces; and it has prevented the central
government, which exerts limited influence at best in the
republics, from controlling public expenditures. The inevitable
upshot is an inability to control price riseso
The principal task that the Markovic government set for
itself when it took office in March 1989 was the halting of
inflation. At that time the inflation rate was less than 400%.
The government has continued to speak optimistically about
overcoming the problem by the
end of the year, but such
assertions have recently been tempered with caution.
For
instance, on June 1 Yugoslav Trade Minister Nazmi Mustafa said
that it would take "maximum liberalization" to correct the
prohlem. 3 The only hope for such a radical policy lies with the
Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia
in December. Nonetheless, nobody can realistically expect the
Yugoslav
politicians
to
overcome their
deep
divisions
sufficiently to tackle such an immense problem as inflationo
Over the past year there has been increasing opposition
from Croatia and
especially
Slovenia
to
rising Serbian
nationalism and to its champion, the Serbian State President
Slobodan Milosevic.
In addition,
changes in some of the
republican leadership and conflicting advice from the ultimate
arbiter, the army, have added to the sense of uncertainty in the
country.
Furthermore, in early July the .plan presented by the
Markovic government to
restrain
the
budget was blocked
temporarily by Serbia, which argued that the cuts fell too
heavily on the poorer areas of Yugoslavia.
On July 14 Serbia
did f i.nally approve the budget with some upward revisions. This
exemplifies the political morass from which the LCY congress
must extricate Yugoslavia in order to pry the economy loose from
excessive bureaucratic control over spending.

Any country that has similar problems must view the
Yugoslav situation with concern. Poland can, perhaps, take some
comfort in the fact that Yugoslavia's inflation rate has not yet
caused widespread civil unrest. The Kremlin, however, which
confronts a potential nationalities crisis even greater than
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Yugoslavia's, must regard with some anxiety the prospect of
decentralization, ethnic hostility, and inflation combining to
erode the cohesion of the state.
David Goodlett
1

Vjesnik (Zagreb), 28 June 1989.

2

vecernje Novosti (Belgrade}, 26 June 1989.

3

Tanjug, 1 June 1989.
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Milosevic's Public Loan Program: a Boost or a Boondoggle?
Summary: Serbia recently adopted a public loan
program,
ostensibly
to
promote
economic
reconstruction;
but some feel it may
be
used to
extract
money under pressure for
dubious ends.

* * *
On June 20 the Serbian National Assembly adopted a proposal
by the republic's State Presidency and its Commission for
Economic Reform for introducing a public loan program, allegedly
to rebuild Serbia's failing economy. The force behind this move
is Serbian State President Slobodan Milosevic, who also heads
the commission. The program is to be financed by the sale of
bonds.
The plan has already run into criticism; and some feel
that the bond sales are little better than a forced additional
tax and, perhaps most important, that much of the money may
never be put to the use for which it is supposedly intended.
The program, whose chief architect is the economist Zoran
Pjanic, a member of Milosevic's economic reform commission, has
been touted in the pro-Milosevic daily Politika as a significant
contribution
toward
market-oriented reforms
through
the
promotion of private ownership and the prospect of profits as a
basis for revitalizing the Serbian economy. The public loan
program is also Milosevic's first major attempt to implement
economic reform in Serbia. A former banker, he has frequently
expressed support for market-oriented reforms; but such views do
not seem in keeping with his generally illiberal political
views, which stress toughness and Serbian nationalism.
It
remains to be seen whether this contradiction is more apparent
than real.
Reform or Propaganda?
It is commonly said in official
circles in Belgrade that the Serbian loan program has "opened
the road to
optimism • . • and
has restored the public's
confidence" in the political leadership and that this has "laid
the foundations of a way out of the economic crisis." 1 The
program is be.ing praised both as a market-related reform and as
a means of helping to revive Serbia's economy, but both of these
claims are open to dispute. It will depend on raising huge
amounts of dinars as well as up to $1 billion in hard currency
in the form of bond sales to Serbs abroad. The program has been
said to be "in line with the market approach to the program of
social reform," and the Belgrade media have clearly stated that
it was initiated and spearheaded by the Commission for Economic
Reform headed by Milosevic. The loan program is also seen as a
major contribution to the "revival of Serbia's economy." This
so-called revival will require financial aid, and bond sales of
up to $1 billion in foreign currency and 2,000 billion dinars
(current exchange rate $1=18,300 dinars) will be needed to begin
the program.2
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One objective is to promote new investments and development
projects, and this is linked to the expected discontinuation of
the system of "self-managing communities of interests (SIZ]," 3
one of the pillars of the system of socialist self-management.
The SIZ is a body of interest groups dealing respectively with
culture, education, health
and welfare, housing, science,
transportation, and public utilities.
As is typical
for
Yugoslav reform projects, this aspect, too, remains vague and
uncertain .
The public loan program is supposedly commercial, but it is
"also an act of patriotism. "4
As stated in the program's
regulations, the funds are intended "solely for new programs and
may not be used for bailing out unprofitable enterprises or
consolidating the Serbian economy, which is burdened with heavy
losses" and is approaching bankruptcy.
Funds from the program
will be distributed only "to the most productive enterprises and
investors" and nwill be used only for financing projects capable
of generating high profits, regardless of whether they are in
the socialized or private sector of the economy."
This may be the law; but in the past, loopholes in the
federal bankruptcy laws enabled unprofitable enterprises such as
the Smederevo Iron and Steel Works to continue operating (the
company has been
unable
to
generate
profits
since the
mid-1960s).
Some critics suspect that bailing out unprofitable
but politically
important, white-elephant
industries might
actually be the undeclared intention of those who devised the
scheme.
Great emphasis has also been placed on attracting foreign
investments from Yugoslav workers and businessmen living abroad.
The declared idea is to encourage the expansion of private
ownership, which was liberalized by the federal constitutional
amendments of November 1988.
The Serbian government has asked
Yugoslavs working abroad to invest voluntarily at least one or
two months salary in the public loan program, and pressure has
reportedly been intense. 5
Subscriptions to the loan bonds can be taken out between 26
June and 20 December 1989 and can be paid either in six
instalments or all at once. Payments are accepted from 26 June
through 25 June 1990 and may be paid in currencies, precious
metals, valuables, or securities. Interest on dinar accounts
will be paid out every two years on the basis of a floating
rate; and interest on deposits in foreign currency
will
correspond to the interest rates paid in the country from which
the money comes. The repayment period for the loans is 10 years;
the first dividends on the bonds will be paid on 30 June 1994.
Repayment will be in dinars or, if the bonds were bought abroad,
in foreign currency.
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Since June 26 Politika has carried accounts of
the
subscription drive every day and has listed the names of the
subscribers
and contributors and the amounts given.
The
contributors range from guest-workers in Western Europe to
professlonals in the United States. Two brothers . living in
Winnipeg paid $103,755 (canadian) into the public loan program.
Several sport clubs in Serbia bought bonds, including Serbia's
top :soccer teams. Up to $200,000 was given in gifts from Serbs
throughout the world. Politika published an article about the
first Serbian public loan program in 1876, when capital was
requirerl to pay the Serbian Army at the time of the Eastern
Crisis of 1-875-1878.
Within three months the 1876 program's
goal_s were achieved.
Despite all the propaganda involved in the current drive,
however, a government committee in charge of overseeing the
program concluded on July 5 that the it had not been promoted
sufficiently.
The committee, which was set up by Serbia's
National Assembly and consists of bank and government officials,
economists, and private businessmen, proposed that the resources
raised through the
scheme
should
also
be used outside
Serbia.7
Reactions. The program has come in for criticism on a
number of grounds . First, some feel that it is too ambitious and
is bound to fall short
of
its
targets and hence prove
disappointing.
Skeptics have, in fact, warned that Serbia's
public loan program will fall short of the funds it hopes to
raise.
In the first 10 days of the bond sales, 19 billion
dinars, $3,000,000, and about OM 2,000,000 have been either
pledged or deposited into the program .. 8 At that rate, the
program will barely be able to generate $200,000,000 by December
20; and the dinar amount, even if the set goal is achieved, will
substantially lose in value through inflation and devaluation.
Second, some ask· bluntly what will actually happen to the
money once it is collected . The Serbian government has not
proposed any projects for injecting the money back into the
economy, although the government has clearly stated
that
projects will be introduced soon. Miroslav Solevic--the Serbian
nationalist and organizer of nwnerous "antibureaucratic" and
pro-Milosevic
rallies
in
the
Vojvodina,
Kosovo,
and
Serbia--said, "I am skeptical of the loan program for the
Serbian economy; but I donated anyway, because I am a Serb." 9
There has been other criticism as well. According to the
Belgrade tabloid Vecernje Novosti, there has been unfounded
criticism of Serbia's public loan program" in Croatia over the
"tasteless advertisements in the [Serbian] media" to promote the
program. 10
The Zagreb daily Vjesnik, however, pointed to the
possible dangers of the public loan program. It said that the
Serbian government had "floated a loan for the revitalization of
the republic's economy without informing either the Prime
21
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Minister [Ante Markovic] or the federal government about it.°'
Without elaborating, the daily warned that "such a move could,
in effect, prove inflationary, despite the good intentions of
the propagandists at the Politika publishing house. " 11
The Ljubljana dailies Delo and Vjesnik have also reported
that a work collective in Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, was
pressured into contributing to the public loan program.
The
dailies alleged that the transportation firm Makosped had been
forced to pay some $28,000. Company officials denied this,
saying that it was '•sheer stupidity" and that the firm along
with its affiliates in Serbia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina had made
its contributions voluntarily. 12
Despite the media coverage, it appears that officials in
the more economically developed
republics _of Slovenia and
Croatia are restraining themselves from criticizing the nature
of the Serbian move.
They may, like the Montenegrins and
Macedonians, adopt a wait-and-see attitude while discussing the
pros and cons of implementing their own public loan programs.
Meanwhile, experts have yet to determine whether Serbia's
program is economically sound or is purely a political move. The
vagueness of the proposals for what is to be done with the money
together with the aggressive tactics used in collecting it in
the first place suggest that healthy skepticism is perhaps in
order.
Milan Andrejevich
1 Politika (Belgrade), 21 June 1989. Only July 18 the Serbian State
Presidency's Commission for Economic Reforms also proposed the introduction
of a stock market as a means of opening up serbia to the world capital
market. A program for this is expected to be announced by late August.
2

Ibid., 20 May 1989.

3

Ibid., 22 June 1989.

4 zajam za Privredu Srbije [The Loan for the Economy of Serbia] (Belgrade:
The Republican Committee for Information of the Socialist Republic of
Serbia, June 1989).
5

Politika, 20 May, 21 and 22 June, 3 July 1989.

6

Ibid., 22 June 1989.

7

Ibid., 6 July 1989.
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Ibid, 7 July 1989. From June 26 to July 18, $4,114,000 and 24 billion
dinars were paid into the program (Borba [Belgrade], 19 July 1989). By
July 27, one month into the program, the figure was only $5,800,000 and
nearly 31 billion dinars (Vecernje Novosti [Belgrade], 29 July 1989).

9

Dnevbik (Ljubljana), 12 July 1989.

10

Vecernje Novosti, 28 JUne 1989.

11

Vjesnik (Zagreb), 13 July 1989.

12

Politika, 9 July 1989.
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Serbian "Isolation" of Albanian Prisoners Criticized

The Serbian policy of holding Albanian
prisoners without filing charges against thero
to
and under conditions that ofte11 appear
involve the use of torture has come under
attack.

Summary:

* * *
In recent weeks opposition to Serbia's so-called isolation
policy toward some prisoners has increased. This policy allows
the police to confine indefinitely individuals who have not been
charged with a crime; the prisoners can be kept in a prison or
elsewhere and are apparently subjected to appalling conditions
and inhumane treatment, including torture. The policy was used
extensively in March 1989 during the Serbian crackdown in the
province of Kosovo,
which
had
enjoyed
constitutionally
guaranteed autonomy from the republic of Serbia since 1974. The
Albanians often appear to have been taken from Kosovo to jails
in Serbia proper for their "isolation," and the brutality shown
them was vividly described by a retailer of fruit and vegetables
who survived the ordeal and was eventually freed.
Although isolation is permitted under the Yugoslav criminal
code, it has been used only rarely, mostly during the riots in
Kosovo in 1981.
In
anticipation, however, of amendments
proposed to the Yugoslav Constitution that were aimed at
reasserting Serbian supremacy over the province, Albanian miners
in Kosovo began a series of strikes and demonstrations in
November 1988. The display of Albanian anger over the loss of
autonomy helped to fuel Serbian nationalism, which was carefully
encouraged by the Serbian political leadership under Slobodan
Milosevic and the media under his control. Milosevic promised
in February that the
leaders
of
the protests would be
arrested. 1
After the amendments were finally ratified in late March,
the strikes turned to riots.
At l~ast 24 people were killed in
the ensuing violence between Albanian protesters and the police
and federal militia. The Serbian police authorities, 1n line
with Milosevic's pronouncement, set out to capture not only
those who had participated in the violence but also anyone
suspected
of "Albanian nationalism and
separatism."
The
authorities seem to have made wholesale arrests, which included
Azem Vllasi, who had been head of the Kosovo provincial
communist party until April 198~.
Vllasi was subsequently
charged
with
"counterrevolution," a
crime
theoretically
punishable by death.
In addition, approximately 240 Albanian
nationalist intellectuals, writers, and businessmen were placed
in "isolation," sometimes merely for advocating opposition to
Serbian control of Kosovo or even for simply feeding the
strikers and demonstratorsg
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Protests Emerge. Opposition to this confinement tactic soon
began to emerge. On April 8 the Kosovo Human Rights Committee
somewhat predictably criticized the trials of the Albanian
dernonstrators. 2 On April 18 the Slovene PEN Center accused
Serbian and other Yugoslav authorities of violating the rights
of Yugoslav writers and intellectuals; they singled out Kosovo
Albanians as victims. 3 As part of a general criticism of laws
which are used to restrict Yugoslav political activity, the
Belgrade-based Yugoslav Human Rights Forum on May 10 questioned
the policy of isolating prisoners. 4
The tone of the criticism sharpened in June.
The Zagreb
daily Vjesnik of June 11 published a scathing account of the
arrest and confinement of one of the victims of "isolation," the
vendor of fruit and vegetables charged with giving food to
striking Albanian miners.
On June 22 the Serbian Writers'
Association, an organization that had frequently supported both
Milosevic and Serbian nationalist arguments, denounced the
"isolation" of prisoners in an open letter to the Belgrade daily
Borba. 5
This was the first public criticism of the policy to
appear in a major publication within Serbia itself. Two days
later Zivko Gruden, a writer for Vjesnik, added his voice to the
growing chorus of criticism; and on June 26 Vjesnik printed
another attack.
Throughout this period
domestic
criticism
has been
buttressed by denunciations from abroad.
In mid-May, for
instance, Helsinki Watch denounced
the "isolation" measures
against Kosovo Albanians. 6 Amnesty International condemned the
policyc 7
Both the European Parliament and the United States
House of Representatives have passed nonbinding resolutions
critical of human rights abuses in Yugoslavia and specifically
the treatment of Kosovo Albanians.
Since the crackdown in Kosovo, the Yugoslav authorities
have either maintained that the police tactics amount to
preventive
detention and are quite
constitutional;
that
criticism of
them
from
abroad
amounts
to unjustified
interference
in
Yugoslav affairs and is
unfair,
given
Yugoslavia's excellent human rights record; and, more recently,
that
the issue is irrelevant, because all prisoners
in
"isolation" have been released. On July 17 Kosovo's Minister of
Internal Affairs Jusuf Karakusi claimed that there were no more
such prisoners. 8
New Revelations To come? Most critics are unconvinced by
such statements.
On July
18,
for instance, Yugoslavia's
official writers' union attacked the policy of"isolation." 9
Indicating, perhaps, that the leadership is sensitive about the
subject, the Yugoslav news agency, Tanjug, reported on July 19
that the authorities in the Serbian city of Leskovac were
investigating 12 prison staff members for use of force against
Albanians interned there in late March. This action, whatever
its intent, is scarcely likely to dampen the criticism.
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doubt find this attention
The Serbian authorities no
embarrassing.
The opponents of "isolation" and of
other
practices directed against the Kosovo Albanians are equally
determined to press their point. This struggle reached a peak
of sorts with the discovery made by Borba on July 14 and
published the next day that Azem Vllasi plans to request that
five major political figures testify at his trial scheduled for
this autumn, although Yugoslav State President Janez Drnovsek
hinted on July 27 that the trial was in doubt. 10 The best-known
name among the five is Slobodan Milosevic, with whom Vllasi had
a long, private conversation shortly before his arrest. The
prospect of such a confontation heightens both the drama of the
controversy over Kosovo and its potential stakes.
David Goodlett
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Borba (Belgrade), 1 March 1989.

2

Delo (Ljubljana), 8 April 1989.

3

Borba, 29 April-2 May 1989 (holiday issue).
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Ibid., 22 June 1989.
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Amnesty International Newsletter, July 1989.
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Politika (Belgrade), 18 July 1989.
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For Drnovsek's comments, see Borba, 28 July 1989.
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